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A genuine historiographical attempt 
to define the nature of Andreas Papan-
dreou’s policies in the 1980s and 
1990s and evaluate its legacy remains 
to be undertaken; in fact, it has not 
even started. However, his earlier 
involvement in Greek politics is an affair 
being closely examined. Stan Draenos’ 
recent biography of Papandreou adds 
considerably to this literature, as it 
approaches the issue from Papandreou’s 
personal perspective. 
The son of a self-made politician, 
Andreas Papandreou migrated to 
the United States early in his life and 
returned to Greece as an established 
academic in the early 1960s. Although his 
first undertaking in Greece was academic 
– the foundation of an Economic 
Research Centre at the invitation of 
the conservative government under 
Constantinos Karamanlis – he was 
eventually attracted to politics. In 
February 1964, he was elected deputy 
for Achaia, the traditional regional base 
of his father, Georgios Papandreou, the 
leader of the Centre Union (CU). It was a 
broad constellation that inherited mainly 
the Venizelist and republican tradition 
of the interwar years, along with left 
of centre currents oscillating since the 
1950s between centrist formations and 
the communist-led United Democratic 
Left. The February 1964 election was 
marked by the landslide majority of 
the CU, which promised to eliminate 
authoritarian practices associated with 
the Civil War, to initiate a policy of 
redistribution in favour of the lower 
classes and steer a more independent 
course on foreign affairs while retaining 
Greece’s NATO membership. 
The feasibility of this reformist policy 
would be put to test very soon, as the CU 
government was to confront the negative 
attitude of power centres and institutions 
identified with the post-Civil War regime. 
The crown strove to retain what it wrongly 
considered as its exclusive control over 
the armed forces. The conservative 
National Radical Union, realizing its low 
electoral prospects, hoped to return to 
government through a constitutionally 
dubious effort of forming a coalition with 
a number of CU parliamentarians who 
were concerned over the government’s 
liberalizing policies and the issue of the 
prime minister’s succession. Groups 
in the army had a vested interest in the 
exclusion of centrist officers from the 
upper echelons of the military hierarchy. 
Last, but not least, the Americans, though 
not opposed in principle to a non-
conservative government, were watching 
closely Georgios Papandreou’s domestic 
and foreign record, lest it undermine the 
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tenets of Greece’s Atlanticist and anti-
communist orientation.
It is in this context that Stan Draenos, 
having undertaken thorough archival 
research, unveils his well-organized and 
elegant narrative and decodes Andreas 
Papandreou’s transformation from an 
American-educated liberal economist to 
a full-fledged Greek politician with radical 
and nationalist leanings. Although his 
entry into politics was conventional, as 
he was elected deputy under his father’s 
wing, the build-up of his political image 
and power base was unconventional. 
His political views were relayed to 
public opinion through carefully staged 
moves. The Cyprus Question became 
the platform of articulation of a policy 
of independence and non-compliance to 
American wishes. Cyprus was an issue 
of enormous emotional value to the 
Greek public. The Zurich settlement of 
1959, which terminated the anti-colonial 
struggle of the Greek-Cypriots, had been 
perceived by both mainland Greeks and 
Greek-Cypriots as a NATO-dictated 
compromise in favour of Turkish 
interests. In August 1964 the President 
of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop 
Makarios III, who followed a policy of 
non-alliance and cooperated tactically 
with the Soviet Union, rejected a US 
plan that provided for the annexation 
of a great part of the island by Greece 
in exchange for a base for Turkey on 
Cypriot soil. Georgios Papandreou 
had lined up with Nicosia not without 
equivocation, as he felt that the Acheson 
Plan was something really close to his 
cherished union (“enosis” in Greek) of 
Cyprus with the “national centre”. His 
policy of rejection of the plan was, as 
a matter of fact, formulated under the 
realization that Athens was not able 
to impose its will on the archbishop 
and the Greek-Cypriots despite the 
deployment of Greek military units 
on the island. Andreas’ approach was 
rather different. He not only accepted 
Makarios’ authority as undisputed, but 
he also articulated Greece’s opposition 
to the plan as an indication of Greece’s 
independence, which reversed a foreign 
policy of compliance to NATO followed 
since the 1940s. 
The CU government’s eventual 
clash with the crown over the issue 
of control of the armed forces in July 
1965 sharpened Andreas Papandreou’s 
ideas and discourse. It also served as 
the element that crystallized his radical 
platform and perfected his political 
machine, a network not necessarily 
identical with the CU’s pre-existing ones. 
He elaborated his scheme of the Esta-
blishment, a combination of the crown, 
the conservative opposition, elements 
of the army and the bureaucracy, the 
economic oligarchy and the Americans, 
which sought to impede the advance 
of emerging people’s forces towards 
development, greater equality and 
independence. His discourse was 
accompanied by a relentless mass 
mobilization, which despite his rhetoric 
was not revolutionary in character, as 
his pre-junta analysis was not Marxist. 
It might even be suggested that it 
was a politically successful formula 
conducive to a country that, as a result 
of urbanization and continuous growth 
since the mid-1950s, was composed of 
many lower-middle-class citizens and 
farmers who wished to enjoy tolerable 
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of May 1967 and possibly implement not 
clearly defined “emergency” measures 
in case of a CU landslide. The agonizing 
indecision of the king, the conservatives 
and the generals was terminated by the 
ruthless seizure of power by a group of 
colonels who were involved in the Army 
General Staff’s planning.
Andreas Papandreou’s public dis-
course in the final months before the 
April 1967 coup was indeed threatening 
to his opponents, an indication of the 
polarization and the vicious circle 
that had been the dominant feature 
in Greek politics from 1965 to 1967. 
Still, it should be kept in the historian’s 
and the general reader’s mind that 
Papandreou was operating under the 
threat of prosecution over the ASPIDA 
affair, a contingency that was kept 
purposefully open by his conservative 
opponents in order to put pressure on 
the dynamic leader of the revamped 
centre-left. Thus, whilst Papandreou’s 
rhetoric and strategy of mass mobili-
zation should not be dismissed easily 
as factors in the polarization that 
marked the period before the coup, his 
opponents, the crown, the army and the 
conservatives, should be burdened with 
the institutional and political turmoil 
they helped to create, as they were not 
really prepared to accept the essence of 
the democratic game, the alternation of 
power. Moreover, taking into account 
the role the United States had played 
in the post-Civil War political system 
and the prestige and connections the 
Americans retained with the Greek élite, 
they share a part of the responsibility 
in not preventing the king and the 
conservatives from the fateful course 
living standards; whereas, despite 
the influx of foreign investment in 
the 1960s, Greece retained a low level 
of industrialization and thus a small 
working class.
Until the final months of 1966 
Papandreou was not out of step with his 
father, despite their obvious differences 
of substance and emphasis. Their 
divergence occurred as a result of the 
quest for a political settlement. Draenos, 
with an eye for detail, looks scrupulously 
into the process of disengagement, 
which was neither completed nor fully 
reversed but overtaken by the coup: in 
December 1966 Georgios Papandreou 
agreed with the king and the leader of the 
conservatives, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, 
that a caretaker government would 
undertake to conduct elections after five 
months. The elder Papandreou accepted 
a system of proportional representation 
that might preclude a CU parliamentary 
majority in an effort to allay the crown’s 
fears. Georgios Papandreou’s strategy 
seemed to Andreas dangerous and an 
unwarranted compromise. He publicly 
denounced the accord, followed by at 
least one-third of CU deputies. In a 
manner that manifested his personal 
magnetism, he was compelled to back 
down after his father’s threat that he 
would be expelled from the party, but his 
image as an uncompromising leader was 
not tarnished. His public differentiation 
had proved to be a sufficient reminder 
of his platform, and he was able to 
resume mass mobilization, which clearly 
annoyed the crown and the conservatives. 
This led to their decision to overthrow 
the caretaker government and appoint a 
conservative one to conduct the election 
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they adopted. Although according to 
available evidence the United States did 
not instigate the coup, the Americans 
were not neutral observers, since they 
had interests and strongly held opinions 
on Greek political developments. This is 
a point vindicated by Draenos’ research. 
Washington shared Greek fears with 
regard to Papandreou’s intentions towards 
the Atlantic alliance, and the US national 
security apparatus was apprehensive 
of a possible Greek drift to neutralism. 
American policy-makers were influenced 
by an analysis that held the view that 
modernization in the developing world 
generated demands and mass mobilization 
and was thus accompanied by political 
polarization and institutional strains. In 
this context, Samuel Huntington argued, 
democracy would not necessarily be the 
political outcome of modernity. In this 
mindset, the Johnson administration 
preferred a course of accommodating 
the junta. With hindsight, the experience 
of socialist victory and rule after 1981 
proved these fears groundless. This is 
a story that Draenos and others might 
follow in future.
Sotiris Rizas
Modern greek history research centre, 
Academy of Athens
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